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Abstract 
The rise of China has provided a plethora of different powers it can use to its advantage, continues its 
rise, or punish noncompliance. Throughout the years of China's rising, it has been accumulating 
considerable hard power in its military and economic capabilities, while also trying to improve on its soft 
power of cultural values. However one often overlooked, and under-appreciated power of China is the 
integrative power of Chinese nationalism. This integrative power that comes from China’s acute usage of 
nationalism to support the legitimacy of its one-party system. This study argues that China has an excess 
of integrative power and that China has skillfully used it to turn unfavorable events and threats, such as 
the Hong Kong protests of 2019, back to their advantage; even if this would mean that China is a primary 
facilitator of conflict and also at times an inhibitor to the de-escalation of conflict. 
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A Weapon of Legitimacy: China’s Integrative Power and its Impact on its 
Reactions to Domestic Conflicts 
Kwok Chung Wong 
On July 1, 1997, when Hong Kong was to be returned to China after 99 years of British 
rule, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) promised an unchanging 50 years of autonomy and 
Hong Kong became the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China. Thirteen years prior to 
reunification, Deng Xiaoping made remarks saying that the issue of Hong Kong was as difficult 
as is the problem with Taiwan, which would require new means to solve new problems, yet “a 
patriot is one who respects the Chinese nation, sincerely supports the motherland’s resumption of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong and wishes not to impair Hong Kong's prosperity and stability” 
(Deng, 1984, para. 8). Interestingly enough, to this day Taiwan has rejected the notion of one 
country, two systems, that governs Hong Kong and refused to become part of China, with some 
even calling for independence. On the other hand, Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997 
under the Sino-British Joint Declaration that was signed in 1984, which effectively ended over 
150 years of British rule over the peninsula. During the handover, despite being promised 
autonomy by the CCP, HongKongers have been skeptical whether one country, two systems can 
last the full 50 years.  
It was the events of Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 that worried the HongKongers 
back then. The Tiananmen Incident made China lose the support of many members of 
international community. Worried for what would become of Hong Kong after reunification, 
many people back then in 1989 began scrambling for immigration fearing for the day of July 1, 
1997 of Hong Kong’s handover. The New York Times back then stated that HongKongers are 
“trapped between a looming Chinese motherland they cannot change and a departing imperial 
motherland – Britain” (Scott, 1989, para. 7). It is important to note that Hong Kong did not enjoy 
the benefits of a liberal democracy under British rule, though HongKongers back then would be 
expecting China along with Hong Kong to become freer and more liberal as time passes. 
Unfortunately, the promised 50 years of autonomy under the one country, two systems was met 
with pessimism when HongKongers saw the tragic events of June 4 when a group of pro-
democracy students was put down by lethal force under the command of the CCP (Blakemore, 
2020). 
This study focuses on answering the question of how China uses integrative power 
containing its two pillars of legitimacy in nationalism and economics to punish noncompliance in 
smaller domestic powers such as Hong Kong. Under this topic, the case of Hong Kong is seen as 
a case of domestic noncompliance, when they do not act in the interest of the CCP party in 
Beijing. The objective of this study is to determine how China reacts to domestic noncompliance, 
as in the case of democratizing Hong Kong to challenge the CCP’s one-party rule in Beijing. 
China’s handling of domestic conflicts deserves more attention by the international community, 
especially since the CCP has begun to use other means of power, such as integrative power to 
replace direct destructive power such as that of Tiananmen 30 years ago. The underlying 
message behind CCP power, is to use any means necessary to maintain the legitimacy of the 
party. Thus, this is a study that seeks to uncover a style of Beijing punishment that it may employ 
when domestic actors, such as Hong Kong takes a move not in the party’s interest such as 
demanding the CCP for more democracy. 
Methodology 
This study is a qualitative review of the current development of the protests, or riots as in 
the CCP perspective, of Hong Kong, and based on this identify the means that the CCP employs 
to punish domestic noncompliance. This will hopefully identify a trend where the CCP clearly 
demonstrating that nationalism and economic power, the two pillars of Chinese legitimacy, are 
integrative powers helping China justify its use of more robust and assertive means to punish 
noncompliance domestically. The author believes it is important to understand what is at stake 
for China and CCP leadership to behave in a way that preferences the use of integrative power to 
shut down noncompliance. 
Since this study will look at what has prompted the use of Chinese integrative power, a 
historical review of how China or the CCP manages to gain that power and tries to maintain that 
power is a prerequisite to further discussion. This will be followed by a literature review of 
Kenneth Boulding’s (1990) book, Three Faces of Power, as this is the piece of literature that 
would be most relevant to the discussion of this study and also supported by other scholars that 
relate themselves to integrative power. This will attempt to show that China does not always rely 
on its economic or military might to deal with domestic noncompliance; instead, they first look 
to the integrative power of the Chinese race under the CCP and attempt to punish using 
nationalism instead. 
This method is not without its limitations. Since the main case study is a recent, on-
going conflict in Hong Kong, most articles related to the conflict will be news articles that could 
potentially exhibit a certain amount of bias and subjectivity. In order to address this potential 
distortion, media sources from both Hong Kong and Chinese state media will be used to provide 
a broader perspective from all parties. This would also include Western media to incorporate 
how the rest of the world view the circumstances from which protests arise. The US perspective 
is important as they have also played a part in the emerging conflict.  
By so doing, this study investigates mainly how the CCP justifies the use of violence 
against protestors and how Hong Kong and the Mainland condemns each other for escalated 
violence. Another problem in researching this topic is the sensitivity of the conflict in both the 
Mainland and Hong Kong. 
Sources utilized in the background and literature review include publications like 
academic texts, journal articles and reliable media websites that address the matter of concern. 
To understand China’s power, it is important to see where China gains its power in the first 
place. Existing literature and theories such as the theory of hegemonic war and the China Threat 
Theory should also be taken into consideration to show the rise of China is generally viewed in a 
negative light in the West, where media outlets have been the most critical of China’s handling 
of the protests in Hong Kong. This literature review on power should explain how scholars 
identify different types of power. The author will attempt to identify the type of power from a 
variety of different types of power that are most likely to compel China to use violence when its 
core interests of one-party rule is threatened. 
Finally, the reason that Hong Kong is chosen as the case to represent China’s integrative 
power is because it is the most recent case that shows this power is in fact, being used rather 
effectively, in putting down protests. This is seen in the case where Chinese citizens, at home 
and abroad, rally behind China in support of it suppressing protests in Hong Kong despite the 
somewhat questionable means used by the pro-Beijing Hong Kong government. The following 
section examines how China has risen to power and what it has learned during this period.  
The Trajectory of China’s Rise: Origins of Chinese Power 
This section reviews the rise of China and discusses where China obtains its power in the 
first place. This is important because later, one can see that the CCP’s integrative power of 
nationalism and economics is derived from the process of the rise of China. Through its peaceful 
rise—now revised into the Peaceful Development of China (Xinhua, 2018) because rise sounded 
too assertive—has managed to accumulate considerable hard power in its economy and military 
capabilities. This concerns some scholars in the West. Neorealist scholars such as John 
Mearsheimer states that, under offensive realism, all states will try to achieve regional 
hegemony, so that it is so strong in the region that no other state will ever think about 
challenging it (Mearsheimer, 2001). As Mearsheimer’s China Threat Theory was gaining 
momentum, the Chinese resisted it with counterarguments. Zheng Bijian (2005), a CCP advisor 
to the former president Hu Jintao, argued in China’s Peaceful Rise to Great Power Status that 
China will always be a developing country, seeking peaceful ways to gain resources, and not 
challenge the US hegemony. Even so, people were skeptical of how long China could stay 
peaceful and whether the so-called peaceful rise was just simple rhetoric for the CCP, buying 
time to catch up with the rest of the world, while the Chinese economy was still on the rise.  
In addition to the perceived military threat that international relations scholars warn of, 
there are also more immediate potential economic threats coming from a strong China. For 
example, Chinese goods from the textile industry are quickly displacing local goods in Latin 
America (Jenkins & Barbosa, 2012). Critics have also accused China of unfair trade practices, 
dumping, and exploiting gray areas of trade regulations around the world, with US President 
Donald Trump being the primary figure assaulting the same trade practices (Hass, 2018). 
Despite all of that, China’s rise on the international stage has been mostly peaceful in the 
absence of war, but Buzan and Cox has said that this rise is cold because there is no mutual trust 
between China and other powers like the US, and China may at times expand at the expense of 
others (Buzan & Cox, 2017). Shambaugh (2013) adds that China is a lonely power, having no 
real allies it can trust nor any allies that completely trust it, despite warm surface relations with 
Russia, Pakistan and North Korea. 
The main worry of the US and the West is where China is going to spend its hard power 
accumulated in the rise. If there would be a reason for China to engage the US in a hegemonic 
war, the reason could be as Robert Gilpin (1988) writes in the Theory of Hegemonic War, that 
most wars happen not because of structural features of the international system, but the distrust 
and uncertainty of the other side. Graham Allison (2017) draws the link between the China-US 
hegemonic struggle to the Peloponnesian War where the rising power of Athens and the 
hegemony of Sparta went to war against each other because Athens threatened a vital alliance 
with Corinth that kept the Spartan homelands safe for centuries. This analogy is not unlike the 
expansion of Chinese investments such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that has gained 
momentum in Asia that could potentially disrupt traditional alliances in Asia, drawing former US 
allies towards Beijing’s economic gravity. Allison (2017) adds that both China and the US must 
make painful sacrifices to avoid a hegemonic war. 
On the other hand, China’s endeavor in turning itself from the poorest country at the end 
of the 1970s, to the second largest economy in the world today, is indeed impressive. Though, 
there are also a few cracks in the seemingly impenetrable Chinese armor of materialistic 
strength. China has problems with food security having sacrificed much of its fertile land in 
exchange for rapid urbanization (Chen, 2007). Another problem China faces is its increasingly 
imbalanced demographics where the male population greatly outnumbers females as an 
aftermath of its One Child Policy established in the 1980s (Chen & Powell, 2012). For CCP and 
policy makers in Beijing, the US encirclement has always been something to worry about as 
China has attempted a wide variety of strategies to attempt to break free of encirclement such as 
befriending Japan and punishing India (Garver & Wang, 2010), both US allies. China attempts to 
use economic incentives such as the BRI for neighboring developing countries, creating a path 
through these countries to break free of encirclement and gaining access to resources in the 
Middle East and Africa. 
That said, although the previous problems are headaches for the leaders in the CCP, they 
do not directly endanger the party’s power or jeopardize its one-party rule. Food security and a 
slowing economy would trouble the CCP in the long term, but China is already trying to remedy 
this through diversifying its trade routes with the BRI. With this in mind, the discussion becomes 
how China is going to deal with these cracks in the armor of its materialistic strength. The 
Communist Party does this by rallying nationalism from the people. The next section looks more 
specifically on how China has dealt with Hong Kong in the past. 
Hong Kong’s Relationship with China 
Hong Kong has always had a difficult time in managing its relationship with China. As 
mentioned above, the Tiananmen Incident was a worrying sign for Hong Kong as China 
violently crushed a movement for democracy. Although the 2019 protests were for democracy, 
one must also remember that Hong Kong has never been a full democracy under British rule. 
Democratic reforms only happened under the last appointed governor of Hong Kong, Chris 
Patten, who claimed in an interview, that HongKongers were always good at being able to “get 
things done” and “make a change” saying that he wanted electoral reforms to become a catalyst 
of democratic change for China (Ibrahim, 2017). In another interview, Patten mentioned that 
undermining Hong Kong’s rule of law will jeopardize its position as the financial center of the 
world (Wintour, 2019), taking away one of the most prestigious symbols of pride for 
HongKongers. 
When these electoral reforms were introduced by Patten, the Basic Law served as the 
guidelines of how Hong Kong should be governed by China after the handover. One of its lines 
states the following: 
The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual 
situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the 
principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief 
Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating 
committee in accordance with democratic procedures. (Full texts of the Constitution and 
the Basic Law-chapter (4), 2017) 
In the early years of handover, it appears that Hong Kong would be much more free than 
mainland China, as CCP officials do not preside in Hong Kong; despite the considerable 
amounts of influence that Beijing does exert (Albert, 2019). HongKongers became increasingly 
concerned about the growing influence of the CCP as time passed, and very critical of the pro-
Beijing government undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy by the protests of 2019. 
The first record of large-scale protests post-unification was in 2003 (Research on Article 
23, 2013). Smaller scale pro-democracy protests have occurred on an annual basis on July 1, the 
anniversary of  the Hong Kong handover, paying homage to the Tiananmen Incident (Bush, 
2014), but none were nearly as big as the protests of 2003. These protests were prompted by the 
government’s attempt to implement Article 23, which prohibits treason, sedition, subversion or 
stealing state secrets of the Chinese government (Research on Article 23, 2013). For 
HongKongers, Article 23 is an attack on the freedom of the domestic press in Hong Kong 
making it difficult for the Hong Kong press to cover problems with the Mainland (Fu et al., 
2005). 
The decade between 2003 and 2014 has been relatively quiet with no real large-scale 
protests, but it is clear that during this period of relative quietness, Hong Kong’s autonomy was 
being eroded at a fast pace. By 2014, elections only allowed HongKongers to vote for 2 or 3 
candidates all from pro-Beijing business groups (Lahiri, 2019). Lai Tung-kwok (2014), from the 
Hong Kong Security Bureau, warned that protestors must be aware of the consequences that 
would arise from any action that would break the law, even if it is under the name of democracy 
and freedom of speech. Yet, the consequences protestors faced in the Occupy Central movement 
was a brutal police response with tear gas, dispersing crowds without achieving concrete results, 
unlike the 2003 protests that resulted in the retraction of Article 23’s implementation. 
That said, the story continues with the aftermath of this pro-democracy movement. Hong 
Kong’s chief executive is elected by 1200-member Election Committee, and Carrie Lam won the 
majority with 777 votes from the committee, defeating her runner up, John Tsang that was more 
popular with the public by over twice the number of votes (Chung, 2017). Lam’s victory was 
seen by the West as a clear erosion of Hong Kong’s democracy and autonomy. For example, US 
Senator Marco Rubio and Representative Christopher Smith claims there is clear interference 
from Beijing in Hong Kong’s elections, which former chief executive Leung defended the 
elections with criticisms against pan-democrats that voted for Tsang instead of putting up their 
own candidate (Ibid.). This being said, Lam was the preferred candidate of the CCP in Beijing.   
Fast-forwarding to 2019, the current Hong Kong protests, in many ways, are a direct 
sequel to the Umbrella Movement (BBC, 2019) that failed to achieve much five years ago, 
triggered by the controversial Carrie Lam’s extradition bill. The first case that invoked the 
extradition bill was when a Hong Kong man murdered his girlfriend in Taiwan (Sun, 2019, para. 
6). The Hong Kong government justified that the extradition bill intends to close a legislative 
loophole and prevent criminals from using Hong Kong as a safe haven to escape crimes. At the 
same time this would also allow fugitives from the Mainland to be sent back to China where they 
may not be fairly tried (Sun, 2019). 
Like the Umbrella Movement, the 2019 protests started out peaceful but escalated in 
violence as protesters clashed with the police and vandalized government properties. Like the 
Umbrella Movement, the police attempted to disperse the protestors through the same means; 
tear gas as protests started to escalate in violence. The problem with this, as later reported, was 
that tear gas used against protestors may have cancer-causing chemicals extra harmful to 
children, pregnant women and the elderly (Is Tear Gas in Hong Kong Making Polluted City a 
Toxic Turn?, 2019). While the original intent of protestors in June was a withdrawal of the 
extradition bill, Carrie Lam announcing its withdrawal in July was “too little, too late” according 
to some critics (Pomfret & Jim, 2019). In response to police brutality, protestors have proposed 
the Five Demands (Wong, 2019) as well. According to a report by a former officer at the Royal 
Hong Kong Police Martin Purbrick (2019), the Yuen Long attacks on July 21 by men in white t-
shirts against protestors were local villagers and Hong Kong mafia gangs, which led to a 
widespread belief that the Hong Kong police were collaborating with criminals that may have 
connections to the mainland. When the Communist Party celebrated its 70th Anniversary of 
Founding on October 1, 2019, an 18-year-old protestor was shot in the shoulder by the police 
(2019-2020 Hong Kong Protests Timeline, 2020). Violence continued to escalate between June, 
when the protests started, and November, when both civilians and police were using force 
against each other. 
Integrative Power of China and Hong Kong 
To understand the nature of the conflict between China and Hong Kong one must 
understand the different types of power operating behind the scenes. One explanation of power is 
the physical, material or symbolic means that can make the adversary comply where otherwise 
they would not (Etzioni, 1975). However, that alone would be insufficient to understand the 
situation in Hong Kong, where China could have suppressed the 2019 protests by military means 
as they did in Tiananmen Square three decades ago. 
In 1989, economist Kenneth Boulding wrote an influential book on the topic of power. In 
this book, Three Faces of Power, Boulding identifies three types of power that can be used to 
understand conflicts: destructive; productive; and integrative (Boulding, 1990). Paying special 
attention to integrative power, Boulding (1990) makes the following remarks: “Integrative power 
may be thought of perhaps as an aspect of productive power that involves the capacity to build 
organizations, to create families and groups, to inspire loyalty, to bind people together, to 
develop legitimacy” (p.25). In other words, integrative power is the ability for people to bond 
and relate to each other and create a sense of legitimacy for their belonging within a community. 
Integrative power is a strong source of CCP power under Boulding’s definition. The CCP does 
not solely rely on its perceived military or economic power, but also has a set of integrative 
power that it prefers to use when dealing with domestic noncompliance such as Hong Kong. Of 
course, while integrative power is most relevant to the discussion of the conflict in Hong Kong, 
the other two faces of power, destructive and productive, also play an important role underneath 
the CCP’s integrative power. For Boulding (1990), conflict arises when one side begins 
increasing power at the expense of their adversary. For Hong Kong, integrative power is 
definitely lost, along with its destructive and productive power, as the CCP increases their own, 
the means of which will be explored in the following section.  
Before going into further detail, a more comprehensive definition of integrative power is 
needed, especially since Boulding never clearly defined what integrative power was. One of 
Boulding’s definitions was love, but if love was too strong of a word then respect could be 
another potential definition (Boulding, 1990). To clarify, Dugan (2003) says that since concepts 
such as love, loyalty and respect are insufficient to explain large group behaviors, a more 
accurate understanding of integrative power should be the sense of belonging to a certain group. 
For example, in Black Power (1992), Hamilton and Ture say that empowering Black people was 
not just about putting Black faces in office, but empowering their community, allowing them to 
have their own goals and forming their own organizations. 
Another definition of integrative power can be found in Hannah Arendt’s (1970) text, On 
Violence. Arendt says that power is people’s ability to act together, which also means that 
individuals do not hold power and a leader in power is only because that person is empowered by 
others (Arendt, 1970). Arendt’s definition adds to our understanding of integrative power by 
adding a cooperative element. Therefore, if we combine the above definitions, we can say that 
integrative power is a type of legitimacy that empowers the leaders of governments, groups or 
ethnicities, which in return forms a sense of community in a society, bonding people together 
through concepts such as love and respect on the individual level. In addition, Boulding (1990) 
mentions that economic power also has a certain amount of integrative power as well. 
In the context of Hong Kong and its integrative power, it is not just about putting Hong 
Kong citizens in office for them to act in Beijing’s interest. Instead, it should be allowing 
HongKongers interested in working towards universal suffrage under the Basic Law, even if this 
may not be in Beijing’s interests. This could potentially be the integrative power that creates 
legitimacy in Hong Kong’s government that the people would be willing to empower through 
love and respect. However, as Boulding (1990) said, each of the three faces of power has both a 
positive and negative use, and in the case of integrative power, there is always the danger of it 
being used to create enemies and alienate people. While not going as far as to marginalize 
HongKongers or create enemies in Hong Kong, the CCP’s use of integrative power have signs of 
gaining power at the expense of their adversary, in this case, Hong Kong. The CCP does so with 
its two pillars of power that supports its legitimacy, and hence its integrative power. At the same 
time, Hong Kong is losing integrative power with more people becoming less faithful in the 
increasingly pro-Beijing government.  
Two Pillars of Chinese Integrative Power 
The CCP’s legitimacy is supported by its two pillars of economic power and nationalism. 
The CCP maintains its one-party rule of China through the use of these two powers to maintain 
legitimacy, and therefore their integrative power in China.  
First of all, in terms of economic power, during the transition from the rule of Chairman 
Mao to Deng, China has turned from a revolutionary state to a more pragmatic economic, and 
development-focused, industrial state. Back in the late 70s, the CCP built its reputation on its 
ability to bring continued prosperity to the people and economic development to China where 
Deng realized that China cannot afford further chaos after a decade of turmoil (Baum, 1996). 
Chu (2013) discovers that, contrary to Western beliefs that the CCP is losing support from 
widespread protests and discontent across the country, the Party is incredibly effective in 
responding to popular demands, steering policies towards economic development, and restoring 
China’s influence on the global stage. Chu (2013) adds that a majority of Chinese people agree 
that despite the faults of the CCP, it is still the best governing system for China. Therefore, one 
aspect of the CCP’s legitimacy, one of the pillars of its integrative power, is based on its 
economic might. One of China’s state media, the China Global Television Network (CGTN) has 
reported that the Xi Jinping mentioned the phrase meihaoshenghuo, which is translated into 
“better life” or “happy life” a total of 14 times in the opening and closing paragraph of the 19th 
Party Congress (Opening session of 19th CPC National Congress, 2017) though Xi has 
introduced several sweeping reforms in the party after his inauguration as President and made the 
Chinese economic pillar a lot more brittle than it appears. Elizabeth Economy (2019) says that 
despite the strong improvements China has made in recent years, there are certain factors 
including too much party control of economic affairs, and the Trump administration’s tariffs 
from the trade war, that have stagnated the Chinese economy. As a result, this forces the CCP to 
find new resolutions for its stagnating economy. 
The second, much stronger pillar of Chinese integrative power is nationalism, seeming to 
even subordinate the economic pillar. The CCP is very effective at building, and actively rallies, 
nationalism for the people to support their one-party rule (Holbig & Gilley, 2010), even 
especially effective when attempting to suppress movements that are against party ideals, such as 
the Hong Kong protests. 
The origins of Chinese nationalism can be traced back to the May 4th Movement in 1919, 
this student uprising against imperialism is still widely celebrated today by the CCP today 
(Buckley & Qin, 2019). While both the May 4th movement and Tiananmen Incident on June 4th 
were student movements, May 4th of 1919 is commemorated in China while June 4th of 1989 is a 
heavily censored topic. On May 4th of 1919, university students marched into Tiananmen Square 
to protest against the unfair ruling of the Treaty of Versailles (Babones, 2019). Despite the fact 
that China was on the side of the 32 victorious nations of the First World War, the Treaty of 
Versailles was in favor of Japan occupying the Shandong province (Qingdao) after German 
retreat, instead of returning it to China (Babones, 2019). This carries a grim reminder for the 
Chinese of its position within international society at the time and reminds them of the many 
unequal treaties the Qing dynasty was forced to sign.  
On September 21, 1949, at the dawn of the People’s Republic of China, Chairman Mao 
gave a lengthy speech about how the “Chinese have stood up” from national humiliation (Mao, 
1949). In 2019, President Xi commemorated the 100th anniversary of May 4th and said that the 
movement was an anti-imperialistic and patriotic campaign to encourage the Chinese youth of 
today to study the spirit of May 4th and devote themselves to the Chinese dream (Xinhua, 2019c); 
2019 also commemorates the 70th anniversary of the People’s Republic of China. Youths under 
Chinese patriotic education are constantly reminded of China’s sufferings under Western 
imperialism and are encouraged to teach them to the next generation (Callahan, 2004).  
Other than textbooks for youths, the CCP also has acute control over the media. Susan 
Shirk (2007) in her book China: Fragile Superpower, says that the Propaganda Department in 
the party is sacred and that they have been trying to bolster the CCP’s legitimacy and promote 
nationalism ever since they were put in charge of the patriotic education campaign (p.84). In 
China, stories about Japan, Taiwan and the US sell and “national myths” are reinforced by 
propaganda (p.85). For example, in 2012, when Tokyo governor Ishihara Shintaro announced 
that the Tokyo Metropolitan government would purchase the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
(Ishihara Seeking to Buy Senkaku Islands, 2012), it agitated a wide group of Chinese as they 
targeted Japanese shopping malls and vandalized Japanese products to protest against Japan. 
Looking towards Hong Kong, there is evidence that Chinese nationalism is used to attack 
Hong Kong and its protestors as well. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of 
China spokeswoman, Hua Chunying (2019), began blaming the US for the conflict in China 
when China sanctioned American nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), saying that these 
NGOs trying to support the Hong Kong protests are to blame for the chaos in Hong Kong and 
sanctions on them are “rightly imposed.” Likewise, China’s state media, Xinhua (2019a) also 
made a similar remark when it condemned the US House bill, Hong Kong Human Rights and 
Democracy Act, saying that the US is attempting to contain the development of China with the 
“Hong Kong card.” The way that the Chinese propaganda machine is manipulating the public 
opinion in the case of Hong Kong is when state media begin calling protestors, rioters, and 
framing these people as “radicals” and “thugs” (Kuo, 2019a). As stories related to the US—
hence foreign intervention—sells in China, the CCP’s propaganda machine effectively 
manipulates the public opinions of the Chinese to be against the Hong Kong protests.  
Recall once again, Boulding (1990) says that conflict can arise when two or more parties 
see changes in the power of one that will benefit or increase their welfare at the expense of 
another. The case of Hong Kong trying to become more democratic is an act of defiance against 
Beijing’s one-party rule, as allowing Hong Kong to become more democratic would mean China 
is no longer under one-party rule, despite being promised two systems, one country. An act 
against the CCP’s power within one-party rule would prompt a violent response from the Party 
in Beijing. The CCP will attempt to defend themselves through the use of their integrative 
power, like nationalism, to prevent their loss of power. This in turn diminishes the potential 
integrative power of Hong Kong and Hong Kong sees Beijing eroding its autonomy prompting a 
violent grassroots response.  
Decline of Hong Kong’s Integrative Power 
Hong Kong has lost integrative power through constant attacks on its autonomy by the 
CCP. While the CCP can enhance its integrative power in dealing with Hong Kong through 
nationalism, the integrative power of Hong Kong is diminishing at a rapid pace. This has also 
caused Hong Kong to view CCP erosion as more and more of a threat.  
Early evidence of this loss of Hong Kong integrative power is seen in Lo Shiu-hing’s 
(2001) book Governing Hong Kong: Legitimacy, Communication and Political Decay. In this, 
Lo argues that Hong Kong’s political decay is a serious issue now that Hong Kong is taking on a 
much more personal style of governance, a “chaotic implementation of public politics,” and 
insensitivity of the government to public opinions (p.13). A succession of protests has occurred 
since Lo’s book published in 2001. First were the large-scale protests in 2003 against the 
implementation of Article 23, then Umbrella Movement of 2014, and now the protests against 
the extradition law in 2019. These show that HongKongers have constantly been aware of the 
erosion of their political autonomy by the CCP’s encroachment into Hong Kong.  
Further evidence of this decay can be seen in how the police treated protestors and 
reporters alike during the protests. The Hong Kong police’s brutality soon became a widely 
known fact across the globe. In a letter, the South China Morning Post attempts to explain police 
brutality with Sigmund Freud’s three parts of the mind theory, saying that Hong Kong police’s 
riot gear conceals their identity and empowers them to act in a way that they will not be held 
accountable afterwards (Ieong, 2019). Police brutality in itself is insufficient to erode 
HongKonger’s faith in the government. The problem was when Carrie Lam defended police 
brutality as an “appropriate force of weapon” (Chan & Ko, 2019). Retired police senior 
superintendent Henry Ho said that Hong Kong was one of the safest cities in the world because it 
had the best police (McCarthy, 2019). This faith has been betrayed by the brutality of police and 
the pro-Beijing government that endorses such action. To make matters worse, Lam has rejected 
an independent inquiry into police brutality, saying that there is no need to subject the Hong 
Kong police that works day and night against “criminal offenses” to such charges (Reid, 2020). 
This shows an active attempt from Lam’s pro-Beijing administration to defend the police, 
reinforcing the fact that the police were able to act without consequences against protestors and 
reporters alike.  
Covering the protests in Hong Kong was not difficult for the CCP propaganda machine. 
While initially the Hong Kong protests received little Mainland media attention, the state media 
quickly began to denounce protestors as rioters as soon as they tarnished the Chinese flag and 
vandalized the national emblem (Xinhua, 2019b). The vandalizing of the Chinese national 
emblem is actually symbolic for the HongKongers who wish to gain more autonomy, and 
distance themselves from the grips of the CCP. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also made 
sharp comments against central figures of the protests. For example, spokesman Geng Shuang 
said student leader Joshua Wong  (a central figure in both the Umbrella Movement in 2014 and 
2019 Protests) had evil plots for Hong Kong independence and that Hong Kong is an internal 
affair and foreign actors should not interfere (Geng, 2019). As usual, China shifted blame to 
foreign forces for the various domestic uprising that China experiences. MOFA spokeswoman, 
Hua Chunying (2019), consistently blames the US for sowing discord amongst Chinese groups 
such as in Xinjiang, as well as trying to contain China’s growth (para. 5). For Hong Kong, state 
media Xinhua, has several articles that blame the US for using the “Cold War mentality,” 
fanning the flames of tension in Hong Kong (Xinhua, 2019, para. 3).  
The Other Faces of Power in the Hong Kong Conflict 
The above section has elaborated how China increased its integrative power while Hong 
Kong was losing its own integrative power. However, it would be inadequate to discuss 
Boulding’s (1990) Three Faces of Power without touching on the other two types of power that 
exist through the presence of integrative power, and how these have an impact on the escalation 
or de-escalation of conflict.  
The first is the destructive power of the CCP that could also be exercised in Hong Kong. 
That said, it is not in Beijing’s interest to rely purely on military might to bring Hong Kong to 
submission. Therefore, the CCP limits it destructive power to threats. Under Boulding’s (1990) 
definition, destructive power can also correspond to threat power in which there are several 
patterns. If applied to the case of Hong Kong, the CCP must decide whether to carry out the 
threat of punishing Hong Kong for its defiance against the party or not. This threat actually came 
two years prior to the protests during President Xi’s visit to Hong Kong on Carrie Lam’s 
inauguration. In 2017, President Xi said in Hong Kong that “any attempt to endanger China’s 
sovereignty and security, challenge the power of the central government…is an act that crosses 
the red line, and is absolutely impermissible” (Lau, 2017, para. 10). In an act of defiance, 
HongKongers took to the streets to protest the pro-Beijing government’s extradition law. If 
Beijing were to carry out its red-line threat, then it can even mean military intervention in Hong 
Kong. The People’s Liberation Army’s Hong Kong garrison is amongst the most elite and 
disciplined of PLA troops, and the fact that these soldiers have been seen on the streets of Hong 
Kong after the protests indicates there is always a possibility of military intervention (Kuo, 
2019b). If the CCP chooses not to carry out the threat, it either means that they do not have the 
necessary destructive power, which is unlikely, or it can mean that the costs are too high to bear. 
In the case of the Hong Kong protests, the latter seems to be true. 
The cost of a military intervention, in other words the exercise of destructive power in 
Hong Kong, would be too high for the CCP to bear. Economically, although Hong Kong today 
only constitutes to 2.7% of China’s GDP, its world class financial and legal system gives people 
overseas the confidence to invest (Sin, 2019). As such, the West such as the US treats Hong 
Kong as a separate entity to China when it comes to trade and investments. This enables Hong 
Kong to keep being China’s hub of foreign direct investments, a role that not even Shanghai can 
replace. (Sin, 2019). Military intervention in Hong Kong would make investors lose confidence 
in its formerly unique style of governance and legal system, likely to reduce Hong Kong to just 
another port city of China. Thus, there is a low possibility of CCP threats being carried out even 
with Beijing’s “red-line”.  
There are two reasons for this, the first being that the situation today is unlike that of 
1989. Back then, the Tiananmen Incident corresponded with the 1989 Poland legislative election 
that would potentially allow Poland to appoint its first non-Communist prime minister and allow 
opposition parties to sit together with their former oppressors for the first time since the Second 
World War. Chinese leaders were unnerved that the Polish “disease” would eventually spread to 
China protests in Tiananmen (Bartkowski, 2014, para 1). These elections were supposed to 
happen on June 4, 1989, the day when the military crackdown happened at dawn in Tiananmen 
Square.  
The second reason is CCP fears backlash from international society if they were to 
employ military crackdown on protests in Hong Kong. After the heavy criticisms of military 
crackdown in Tiananmen, the CCP leadership has become much more aware of its international 
image when handling “sensitive issues” such as the Hong Kong protests. In the past, China 
responded to the Tiananmen criticisms by starting to contribute to international peace such as 
participating UN peacekeeping operations, including joining the UN Transitional Authority to 
Cambodia (UNTAC; He, 2019). Zheng Bijian’s (2005) call for China’s peaceful rise was to 
reassure the world that China’s rise would be peaceful despite the mishaps in Tiananmen. Thus, 
minus an event on the scale of the Polish legislative elections, it would be highly unlikely that 
the CCP would jeopardize its fragile image on the international stage to shut down the Hong 
Kong protests with robust military, destructive power. That said, the tension of conflict will be 
maintained as long as democratic movements in Hong Kong continue and the CCP continues to 
make threats.  
Boulding’s (1990) productive power is also closely related to exchange power under the 
economic power category. As shown above, although economic power is one of the pillars of 
CCP legitimacy, it only constitutes a portion of Chinese nationalism and CCP legitimacy as 
integrative power. That said, in some ways Hong Kong’s one country, two systems in itself is a 
type of exchange power. The deal was to allow Hong Kong to remain autonomous with two 
systems, but in exchange they would always be one country under China. For Boulding (1990), 
productive power is the tools and machines that make things, but in relation to integrative power 
it is also the power of people coming together to form legitimacy through organizations, groups 
and families. Therefore, in this case, where the CCP is an inhibitor to HongKongers binding 
together under the flag of one country, two systems, Hong Kong’s productive power is disrupted 
by China. Economically, Hong Kong no longer has the value it did for China, compared to the 
time of handover. In that case, the productive power that Hong Kong does hold is arguably the 
ability to produce democracy for China, which the CCP is trying to prevent. Therefore, 
productive power actually escalates conflict in the case of Hong Kong as the CCP does not allow 
any other form of unity or legitimacy to be produced within its borders that would challenge its 
one-party rule.  
The CCP can use destructive power to make threats against Hong Kong, but it would be 
unlikely that it would carry these threats out to protect its image on the international stage 
without a major event in Hong Kong that would immediately pose a threat to their one-party 
rule. However, as Hong Kong’s economic value diminishes for China, the remaining productive 
power that Hong Kong carries for the CCP is the ability to create democracy under the Chinese 
flag of one country. It would be unlikely that the CCP would value this productive power, and 
instead, increase conflict to try to curb this.  
Conclusion 
At the time of writing, it has been 23 year since Hong Kong’s handover as a British 
colony to China. At the time of the handover, former leader Deng Xiaoping promised 50 years of 
unchanging autonomy from one country, two systems. Unfortunately, this autonomy has been at 
a steady decay under the constant attacks on Hong Kong from the CCP, and we have barely 
reached the 25-year halfway mark.  
The peaceful rise of China was initially seen with skepticism, but regardless of whether 
China’s rise can stay peaceful or not, it does not change the fact that China has successfully 
transformed itself from one of the poorest countries in the world to the second largest economy 
today. The hard military and economic might that the CCP accumulated under China’s rise is 
now helping them create a powerful force of nationalism that becomes an integrative power that 
China will use to punish its smaller domestic actors such as Hong Kong when in defiance. In 
order to protect its fragile international image, the CCP does not usually exert this integrative 
power, with the exception of CCP one-party rule under threat. 
The path of Hong Kong was clear. With universal suffrage as a goal written in the Basic 
Law, there was a succession of pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong every year. The 2003 
protests against the implementation of Article 23, the Umbrella Movement of 2014 calling for 
more democracy and the 2019 protests against the extradition bill were of particular scale and 
note.  HongKongers become more threatened with each passing year about the CCP’s 
encroachment on one country, two systems.  
Although it is perfectly possible for the CCP to march the PLA into Hong Kong with 
destructive power, they have shown restraint in employing destructive power in Hong Kong as 
costs may be too high for the CCP’s rather fragile international image. Hong Kong has the 
productive power to create a more democratic system under the Basic Law that would go against 
the CCP’s one-party rule. This is a productive power that the CCP is actively trying to curb. 
With the CCP’s skilled use of propaganda, China blames foreign forces such as the US of trying 
to contain China’s growth and breaking the unity of the Chinese. This type of news sells and is 
well received in China. The CCP have also denounced the protesters in Hong Kong calling them 
thugs.  
As a final remark, the author would like to recommend a path toward resolution of the 
current Hong Kong conflict. As mentioned above, Carrie Lam has prevented the establishment of 
an independent inquiry into the brutality of Hong Kong police during the 2019 protests. Lam’s 
defense of police brutality has caused one of the biggest losses of Hong Kong integrative power 
and she needs to hold the police accountable but has not done so. The victory of pro-democracy 
candidates in 17 out of 18 districts in Hong Kong is a step forward for a more open and 
transparent Hong Kong as it shows that public opinion has not turned against Hong Kong 
democracy yet (McDonell, 2019). Still, the CCP is known to be uncompromising and 
unforgiving against movements that challenge its one-party rule. Nationalism in China will 
always be a force of integrative power that will be manipulated by the CCP’s propaganda 
machine. Therefore, if there is to be any change in Hong Kong, it may well have to begin from 
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